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Abstract
This paper analyzes the public provision of private goods for children in a politico-
economic model with endogenous fertility. The government provides every child with
goods that can also be purchased by parents in private markets, and the level of pro-
vision is determined by majority rule. Households with many children beneﬁt from
the public provision more than those with fewer children; thus, a political conﬂict
arises between them. The distribution of the number of children across households,
which is a crucial factor for determining which group is politically dominant, is en-
dogenously determined by households’ fertility decision. The sequential interaction
between fertility and political decisions might lead to multiple equilibria: equilibrium
with high-fertility and low-private/public-spending-ratio and equilibrium with low-
fertility and high-private/public-spending-ratio. Our model could explain the large
diﬀerences in fertility and structure of child-related spending across countries.
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11 Introduction
In most countries, the government provides goods that are available in private markets;
these include education, health care, transportation, postal service, and police protection.
Issues related to such dual-provision schemes increasingly come to the forefront in policy
debates and are investigated by academic economists. This paper concentrates on an
important aspect of such schemes that has been neglected by past studies in political
economics: some of dual-provision schemes, such as education and childcare services, are
targeted at children, and these aﬀect not only the private purchase but also the fertility
decision in each household.
The current debate on public policies for children often focuses on the eﬀects of these
policies on fertility rates against the backdrop of heightened concerns over declining fer-
tility rates in some developed countries. The diﬀerence in the generosity of public services
for children is considered to be a source of the fertility diﬀerential across countries; in
fact, positive correlation between generosity and the fertility rate is often found in data
(e.g., d’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005; Feyrer et al., 2008). The argument that generous public
policies for children should reduce the out-of-pocket child-related costs borne by house-
holds and thus make them fertile can be deduced from standard textbook models of family
economics (e.g., Cigno, 1991; Ermisch, 2003). However, there remains an unanswered ques-
tion: why does the public policy for children vary greatly across countries? This paper
demonstrates that an explanation to this question follows from standard economic models
in a less extreme form.
Using a simple functional form for preferences and standard assumptions about the
quantity-quality tradeoﬀ for children, we develop an extension of the public-provision-
of-private-goods model of Epple and Romano (1996b) and Gouveia (1997) . The basic
framework is the standard “demand” model of fertility behavior (see Birdsall (1988) for
a summary), in which each household receives utility from the quantity and quality of
children and chooses both of them in the face of a constraint on the total amount of time
that can be devoted to child rearing and labor supply. The government provides every
child with goods that improve his or her quality—for instance, education—these goods can
2also be purchased by parents in private markets. The funding level for public provision
is collectively determined by majority rule. Households with many children beneﬁt from
the public provision more than those with fewer children; thus, a political conﬂict arises
between them. What is important in our model is that the number of children, which
is crucial for determining whether or not a household belongs to the group supportive of
public provision, is an endogenous variable derived from the household’s fertility decision.
We show that under a realistically plausible assumption on the timing of fertility and
voting decisions, the single-peakedness of the preferences over tax rates is satisﬁed in the
voting process and the median-voter theorem holds (see Black, 1948). There exists at
least one rational-expectation political equilibrium such that the voting outcome expected
by households in their fertility decision is consistent with the voting outcome actually
chosen in the economy populated by those households. Furthermore, multiple equilibria
arise for reasonable parameters: both the situations—where a majority of the population
prefers a relatively high funding level or a relatively low funding level—are consistent with
the behaviors of fully-rational households. Since the public provision for children induces
parents to substitute quantity for quality by aﬀecting the relative price of quantity to
quality, the equilibrium with high (low) public funding corresponds to the one with low
(high) private funding and high (low) fertility.
Since the types of issues we consider are prominent in the education debate, we refer to
the good on which we focus in our analysis as education.1 In contrast to our model, many
past studies in this literature, including the inﬂuential work of Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz,
1974), assume that public education and private one are mutually exclusive: agents are
not allowed to further supplement public education, but are allowed to opt out of it in
order to attend private education. This assumption is based on the fact that an individual
cannot be a full-time student at both public and private schools concurrently. However,
there are several reasons why we believe that agents can privately supplement the public
education. First, some forms of private supplements, such as private tutoring and summer
1The results of this paper are applicable, more generally, to dual-provision settings wherein each house-
hold can privately supplement the public provision, public provision is targeted at children, and parents
place value on the child’s consumption of that good. Other striking examples would be childcare and
healthcare services.
3schools, are feasible and actually observed. The purchase of materials contributing to
the intellectual development of children, such as personal computers and encyclopedias,
can also be considered as a private supplement. Second, in many developed countries,
private schools are supported by the government in a variety of ways (e.g., subsidies, tax
exemptions, and vouchers); in such cases, we can regard the private school expenses of
households as private supplements in eﬀect.2 The assumption that agents can opt out but
not top up is only one extreme, as is the one that agents can top up but not opt out: the
reality must be somewhere between these two assumptions.3
Our model is especially applicable to the discussion about private tutoring—namely,
education outside the formal schooling system: besides the formal school education that is
usually provided free of charge by the government, parents send their children to private-
tutoring facilities with the intention of improving their performance at school or increasing
their chances of success at the entrance examination of universities.4 In East Asian coun-
tries, typically, the ratio of public spending on education to GDP is low, whereas private
education-related spending is high owing to the prevalence of private tutoring.5 Further-
more, in East Asian countries, fertility is much lower than that in countries with similar
GDP per capita. These distinctive features of East Asian countries have often been at-
tributed to exogenous factors, such as the preferences and education system (e.g., the
eagerness to educate children, existence of competitive entrance examinations to universi-
ties). The multiplicity derived in this paper implies that a seemingly exogenous education
system might be collectively determined by rational self-interested agents.
Here, we characterize our research in the context of studies on the relationship between
2The extent of ﬁnancial support for private schools at the elementary and secondary levels vary greatly
across countries. For instance, private schools are fully supported by the government in Belgium, partially
supported in France and New Zealand, and hardly supported in the United States (Toma, 1996).
3de la Croix and Doepke (2008) develop a politico-economic model with endogenous fertility under
a polar assumption contrasting to ours: agents can opt out but not supplement public education. They
employ probabilistic voting as the political mechanism because of the non-single-peakedness of preferences.
One advantage of our model is tractability: we can rely on the single-peakedness of the topping-up model
(Epple and Romano, 1996b; Gouveia, 1997)
4Private tutoring has long been a major phenomenon in parts of East Asia. Recently, it has grown
rapidly in other areas, such as other parts of Asia, Europe, and North America, and is drawing more
attention from educational scientists (Bray, 2006).
5See, for example, Kim and Lee (2001) and Bray and Kwok (2003) for details of the reality of education
in East Asia.
4fertility and investments in human capital. A large part of the literature is based on the
growth theory and tries to explain the demographic transition in the process of economic
development (e.g., Becker et al., 1990; Galor and Weil, 2000). In contrast, our model is
static and regarded as a model explaining the fertility diﬀerential among post-demographic
transition countries. Almost all developed countries experienced signiﬁcant reductions in
fertility in the past few centuries; however, the eventual fertility rates currently being
observed vary greatly among countries: total fertility rates in 2004 are as low as 1.3
in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain and nearly 1.8 in Denmark, France, Norway, and
Sweden (United Nations, 2007). Given the fact that countries with similar GDP per
capita have varying fertility rates, it seems that the current fertility diﬀerential among
developed countries cannot be explained only in terms of demographic transition. This
paper improves on the literature by stressing that both the manner of investing (i.e., the
ratio of public investment to private investment) and the quantity of investment play an
important role in the determination of fertility.
In our model, self-fulﬁlling prophecies of voting can occur and lead to multiple equilib-
ria. The intuition is simple; if pivotal households anticipate a high funding level for public
education, they will choose to have a large number of children. Once the households decide
to have many children, it is actually optimal for them to vote for a high funding level.
Conversely, a low-funding-level equilibrium can also be sustained. The result that agents’
expectations about future policy may be self-fulﬁlling when public policy is endogenized is
not new; in particular, Saint-Paul and Verdier (1997) derive the similar multiplicity result
in a voting model regarding the interaction between capital income tax and saving deci-
sions.6 However, we would like to emphasize that the mechanism generating multiplicity
here is especially important for the issues discussed in this paper. What really matters
for the mechanism to work well is that each household makes an economic decision prior
to the determination of public policy and also that the decision is irreversible. Owing
to the absence of a market for trading children, the fertility decision is one of the most
6The possibility that the feedback mechanism between economic and political decisions generates mul-
tiple equilibria has been pointed out in various contexts (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1996; Hassler et al.,
2003).
5irreversible decisions for any household.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
our model and characterize the equilibrium while taking public policy as given. In Section
3, we endogenize the policy through majority voting and derive the political equilibrium.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
We consider an economy with a large number of households with identical preferences over
the numeraire commodity, ci, the number of children, ni, and the quantity of education
for each child, ei.7 We normalize the population size to unity. Household i’s preferences
are represented by:8
γ (φlnei +l nni)+( 1− γ)lnci,
where γ ∈ (0,1) and φ ∈ (0,1) denote the relative weight given to children and the relative
weight given to their education, respectively.9 Households are diﬀerentiated on the basis of
wage rate (i.e., the quantity of numeraire commodity that they can acquire per unit of time
in the labor market), which is the only source of heterogeneity in our model. We assume
that wages across households are distributed according to the cumulative distribution
function F (·) with ﬁnite mean. It is assumed that the support of F (·)i sR+ and that
F (·) is strictly increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
To educate children, parents must utilize educational services, which can be obtained
through private purchase and government provision. All children receive the same quan-
tity of public education in this economy. On the other hand, households are allowed to
supplement the publicly provided quantity, and the quantity of private purchase may diﬀer
7We follow the standard quantity-quality fertility model in assuming that parents treat their children
equally.
8The logarithmic utility function is chosen for the sake of brevity, as is often the case in this literature
(e.g., de la Croix and Doepke, 2008); what matters for our results is the homotheticity of preferences over
the bundle (ei,n i,c i).
9The assumption φ<1 guarantees that the second-order condition for maximization is satisﬁed in the
household’s maximization problem; if φ ≥ 1, households obtain inﬁnite utility by reducing the number of
children close to zero and thereby increasing their education level close to inﬁnity (see Equation (8)).
6across households. It should be noted that the fact that the quantity of public education
is common to all children does not mean that all households receive the same quantity of
public services, because the number of children may diﬀer across households. Household
i’s education level for each child, ei,i sg i v e nb y
ei = si + g, (1)
where si and g denote the quantity of private purchase and quantity of public provision
per child, respectively. The publicly provided quantity cannot be traded and thus, si must
be nonnegative.10
Each household is endowed with a unit of time that can be devoted to child-rearing
and labor-market activities. Raising one child takes fraction z ∈ (0,1) of a household’s
time. The government collects taxes from all households at a constant rate t. Each house-
hold allocates the after-tax income to consumption expenditures and private educational
services. The budget constraint for household i whose wage is wi is then given by
wi (1 − zni)(1− t)=ci + sini. (2)
It is assumed that one unit of educational services is produced with one unit of the nu-
meraire in the private sector and that private educational services are provided by price-
taking suppliers. The assumption that child-rearing requires parents’ time input while
child-education requires educational services traded in the market, which is often used in
the quantity-quality model, is crucial for generating fertility diﬀerentials. It implies that
the cost of having a child relative to the cost of education rises as the wage rises.
Public provision is ﬁnanced by a proportional tax, t, on income. Assuming that the
technology for converting expenditures into quantity of service is the same as that in the
10Utility is a function of the total amount of education ei, but does not depend on the share of the
quantity of private purchase, si, nor the share of the publicly provided quantity, g. This assumption
follows the convention of the literature on the public provision of private goods.








where n(w) denotes the number of children of the household with wage w. To simplify
notation, we introduce the following new variables: ¯ n and ¯ m, which denote the average
(as well as total) number of children,
  ∞
0 n(w)dF (w), and the average (as well as total)
labor income,
  ∞
0 [1 − zn(w)]wdF (w), respectively. Equation (3) can be rewritten as
t¯ m = g¯ n. (4)
Since public education is as eﬃcient as private education and there is no externality
in education, redistribution is the sole motive for public education in this model, as is
the convention of the positive literature. It is noted that we cannot control t and g
independently because they are linked through the government’s budget constraint. If we
choose one as a control variable, then the other is endogenously determined. Following
the convention of the literature, we treat t as a policy variable that is determined by the
government: it is exogenously ﬁxed in this section, and chosen through voting in the next
section.
2.2 The Household Decision Problem
Household i solves the following maximization problem:
max
si,ni,ci
γ (φlnei +l nni)+( 1− γ)lnci, (5)
s.t. equations (1), (2), and (4),
si ≥ 0, ni ≥ 0,
given t ∈ (0,1), ¯ m,¯ n.
(6)
The solution to this problem can either be interior or at a corner; there is a threshold
wage rate, ˆ w, below which households choose a corner solution of not supplementing the
8publicly provided quantity. The threshold is
ˆ w =
t¯ m
φz(1 − t)¯ n
. (7)
For a household with a suﬃciently high wage such that wi > ˆ w holds, there is an
interior solution for the optimal private supplement level; the ﬁrst-order conditions imply
si =
φz (1 − t)wi¯ n − t¯ m
(1 − φ)¯ n
and ni =
γ (1 − φ)(1− t)wi¯ n
z (1 − t)wi¯ n − t¯ m
. (8)
It follows that ∂si/∂wi > 0a n d∂ni/∂wi < 0. The higher the wage rate, the larger is the
quantity of private education and the smaller the number of children. The above result is
drawn from the following two assumptions: (i) the cost of having a child increases with
wage, while the cost of education per child is independent of wage and (ii) due to the
presence of public education, the education level of children remains positive even if the
parents do not privately purchase any educational services.
It is noteworthy that the presence of public education, g, guarantees that the number
of children is a nontrivial function of wage rate. Consider the impact of the rise in wage
rate. On the one hand, it increases the cost of having children, ceteris paribus, because
the time spent for child-rearing could have instead been used to work and purchase educa-
tional services. Consequently, parents are induced to substitute quality for quantity (the
substitution eﬀect). On the other hand, the rise in wage rate makes the household wealth-
ier, and thus it desires to have more children and purchase more educational services (the
income eﬀect). If g = 0, then those two eﬀects on fertility cancel out and there is no change
in fertility. If g>0, then the marginal utility of education decreases more slowly than the
increase in wealth: the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect and fertility falls.
T h ep r e s e n c eo fg mitigates the decline of the marginal utility of education.11 The lowest
and highest possible fertility rates for households that choose a positive supplement are
11Using the mechanism mentioned here, de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) and Moav (2005) derive
ﬁrst-order conditions similar to those of our model. They assume that the human capital of children is
positive even if they are not educated at all: all agents are born with an elementary level of human capital
by assumption. In our model, alternatively, the presence of public education guarantees that children














Figure 1: (a) the relationship between fertility and wage rate and (b) the relationship
between private education and wage rate
given by limwi→∞ni = γ (1 − φ)/z and limwi→ ˆ w ni = γ/z, respectively.
For a household whose wage is suﬃciently low such that wi ≤ ˆ w holds, the optimal
private supplement level is zero; the ﬁrst-order conditions imply




Once a household is at a corner solution and does not supplement the public provision,
fertility no longer increases as wage decreases.
Using the results described above, we can depict the relationship between fertility and
wage rate and the one between private education and wage rate (Figure 1). These relation-
ships are consistent with the well-known evidence: high-income (low-income) households
choose relatively low (high) fertility rates with relatively high (low) investment in their
oﬀspring’s education.
We conclude this subsection by developing some comparative static results.
Proposition 1. (i) For households that choose a positive supplement, a rise in t,ad e -
crease in ¯ n, and an increase in ¯ m decrease the education level of their children and increase
10fertility. (ii) A rise in t,ad e c r e a s ei n¯ n, and an increase in ¯ m decrease the proportion of
households choosing a positive supplement.
Proof. Using (4) and si in (8), the total expenditure on education per child is represented
by
ei = si + g =
φ
1 − φ
z (1 − t)wi¯ n − t¯ m
¯ n
. (10)
The results are derived by diﬀerentiating (7), ni in (8), and (10) with respect to t,¯ n,a n d
¯ m, respectively.
Ar i s ei nt aﬀects a household’s behavior through two channels. First, provided that
¯ n and ¯ m are ﬁxed, it implies an increase in the quantity of public provision, which lowers
the cost of having a child relative to the cost of education for a given education level.
Second, it implies a reduction in the after-tax income per unit of time, which lowers the
cost of having a child relative to the cost of education. As a result, it induces parents to
substitute quantity for quality of children; the combined public and private expenditure
on education per child falls, whereas the public expenditure rises. An increase in ¯ n implies
a decline in the quantity of public provision (the congestion eﬀect on public education),
inducing parents to substitute quality for quantity. An increase in ¯ m implies an increase
in the quantity of public provision because it broadens the tax base, inducing parents to
substitute quantity for quality.
Proposition 1 states that the public provision of goods for children reduces each child’s
consumption level of those goods when private supplements are allowed and fertility is
endogenous. This is a result that stands in sharp contrast to previous related studies.
In the standard public-provision-of-private-goods model, owing to the “residual” nature
of private demand, public provision aﬀects the demand of the good only through the
income eﬀect; agents increase (decrease) the combined public and private demand if their
eﬀective income rises (falls) as a result of the public provision (see Epple and Romano,
1996b; Gouveia, 1997). It is the endogeneity of fertility that diﬀerentiates our result from
theirs; public provision has a price eﬀect as well as an income eﬀect because it changes
the relative price between the quantity and quality of children.
112.3 Equilibrium
Thus far, we have analyzed the individual decision problem given other households’ actions,
that is, given ¯ n and ¯ m. In reality, however, both ¯ n and ¯ m are endogenously determined by
aggregating each household’s maximization behavior. In this subsection, we characterize
the equilibrium of this economy. It follows from ni in (8) and ni in (9) that, in equilibrium,
the fertility rate ¯ n must satisfy the following condition:






γ (1 − φ)(1− t)w¯ n
z (1 − t)w¯ n − t¯ m
dF (w), (11)
where the ﬁrst term and the second term of the RHS represent the fertility rates of
households with no supplement and those with positive supplement, respectively. We
call this equation the “fertility curve;” it is the mapping from the average labor income to
the fertility rate. Furthermore, in equilibrium, the average labor income ¯ m must satisfy
the following condition:
¯ m =( 1− γ)






(1 − γ + γφ)z (1 − t)w¯ n − t¯ m
z (1 − t)w¯ n − t¯ m
dF (w), (12)
where the ﬁrst term and the second term of the RHS represent the labor incomes of
households with no supplement and those with positive supplement, respectively. We call
this equation the “labor-income curve;” it is the mapping from the fertility rate to the
average labor income. The equilibrium of this economy is given by a tuple (¯ n, ¯ m)t h a t
satisﬁes (11) and (12) simultaneously. Using the equilibrium conditions, (11) and (12), we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Given t ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium. The fertility curve provides a unique fertility rate that
is associated with a labor income. This uniqueness arises from the strategic substitutability
among households in the fertility decision: if ¯ n rises, each household is induced to reduce
fertility through the congestion eﬀect on public education. Since a rise in ¯ m induces each













household to increase the fertility by improving public education, the fertility curve is
upward sloping. The result that the labor-income curve provides a unique labor income for
a particular fertility rate and is upward sloping also comes from the analogous argument.
The result of Proposition 2 does not depend on the assumption of logarithmic utility;
it holds for a larger class of preferences such that the demand for quantity of children
is increasing in the government provision, thereby generating strategic substitutability
among households. The above is veriﬁed as follows. Each household’s fertility decision is
aﬀected by the change of others’ fertility decisions only through the change of g = t¯ m/¯ n.
Therefore, the change such that ¯ m and ¯ n change equiproportionately does not alter any
household’s fertility. Suppose that (¯ n , ¯ m ) is an equilibrium. Since the equiproportional
change of both ¯ m and ¯ n does not alter any household’s fertility, any points on the straight
line passing through the origin and (¯ n , ¯ m ) never be an equilibrium. For ¯ n (> ¯ n )t ob ea n
equilibrium, g must rise, that is, ¯ m must rise proportionately more than ¯ n. On the other
hand, for ¯ m (> ¯ m ) to be an equilibrium, g must fall, that is, ¯ n must rise proportionately
more than ¯ m. The above two possibilities cannot occur simultaneously. It follows from an
analogous argument that change in any direction is excluded, and thus, points other than
(¯ n , ¯ m ) cannot be an equilibrium.
Given the equilibrium fertility rate ¯ n∗ and the equilibrium average labor income ¯ m∗,
it follows from (4), (7), (8), and (9) that the equilibrium allocation of this economy,
13{{n∗
i},{e∗
i},g∗}, is completely speciﬁed. Using the equilibrium conditions, (11) and (12),
we can analyze the eﬀect of tax rates on the equilibrium. The results are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (i) A rise in t raises the fertility rate. (ii) A rise in t decreases the
average labor income. (iii) A rise in t increases the proportion of households choosing no
supplement. (iv) A rise in t raises the ratio of public spending on education to the total
spending.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This proposition states that the enhancement of public education lowers private spend-
ing and raises the fertility rate in equilibrium. This is because the public provision of
education induces parents to substitute quantity of children for quality by changing the
relative price between the two, as has been shown in Proposition 1.
It is often argued that generous public policies for children should reduce the out-of-
pocket child-related costs borne by households and make them fertile; this is supported by
some cross-country data (e.g., d’Addio and d’Ercole, 2005; Feyrer et al., 2008). Proposition
3 formally demonstrates that such an argument holds in equilibrium where heterogeneous
households interact with each other through the government’s policy.12
3 Political Equilibrium
3.1 Timing of Events
In this section, we demonstrate that the tax rate, which is exogenously speciﬁed in Section
2, can be endogenized by introducing voting among the population, and that there exists
a rational-expectation political equilibrium.
12Besides cross-country data, there are some time-series data suggesting that the mechanism highlighted
here is not just a theoretical possibility but should also play an important role in policy debates. The
experience of Japan since the 1970s is a prominent example. In Japan, the education curricula in elementary
schools, junior high schools, and senior high schools are prescribed by a teaching guideline of the Education
Ministry. Since the 1970s, the Japanese government amended the contents of the guideline several times
and gradually reduced the amount of course hours at each education stage: the number of course hours in
the compulsory education system decreased by more than 10%. As predicted by our model, the fall of the
fertility rate and the increase of households’ education-related spending for primary and lower-secondary
education levels were simultaneously observed around the same time as such policy changes.
14We consider a two-stage game; the timing of events is as follows.13
1. Each household decides the number of children it has (this decision is irreversible). In
making this decision, each household treats the fertility choices of other households
as given and has perfect foresight regarding the outcome of the future voting process
over public funding for education.
2. All adults in the economy vote on tax rates and the tax rate is determined by majority
rule. As a result, the quantity of public education per child is also determined
because the fertility and attendant labor supply have already been determined in the
ﬁrst stage. After voting and understanding the outcome of the voting process, each
household allocates its after-tax income to consumption expenditures and private
educational services.
This timing is motivated by the fact that the public funding for education is more
adjustable than fertility. Usually, in a democracy, the government budget must be consid-
ered and approved annually and there is an election every few years, which might bring
about a major change in the political climate. On the other hand, in most countries, the
completion of an elementary school education curriculum takes at least a decade from the
time of birth while the completion of a secondary school education curriculum takes about
ﬁfteen years. Parents cannot have a child who is ready for school at birth or easily disown
a child who has reached school age. At the time of making a fertility decision, each house-
hold must anticipate other households’ fertility behaviors and the future political outcome
in an economy populated by those households. Adopting such timing assumptions, we can
formulate the political equilibrium of our model as follows.
Deﬁnition (Rational-expectation majority voting equilibrium). A political equi-
librium is a set {t∗,{n∗ (w)}} such that
1. all households make the optimal fertility decision n∗ (w), taking as given the tax rate
t∗ and other households’ fertility decisions {n∗ (w)};
13We will investigate the implications of alternative timing assumptions later.
152. given {n∗ (w)}, there does not exist another t  such that t  is preferred over t∗ by
more than half of the population.
On the basis of the assumption that households must decide the number of children
they have before voting and that this decision is irreversible, all households take as given
their fertility decisions {n∗ (w)} at the time of voting. We can derive the equilibrium by
the following procedure: (i) we derive the equilibrium condition for fertility set {n(w)},
given a tax rate t; (ii) we derive the equilibrium condition for tax rate t, given a fertility
set {n(w)}; and then (iii) we search a set {t,{n(w)}} that simultaneously satisﬁes both
the conditions.
3.2 Voting Stage
We have already derived the equilibrium condition for fertility set {n(w)},g i v e nat a x
rate t in Section 2 and can now apply the same results. Here, we consider the equilibrium
condition for tax rate t, given a fertility set {n(w)}. At the time of voting, the number of
children and the attendant labor supply in each household have already been determined.
Thus, focusing on the voting stage, we observe that this model has almost the same
structure as the model of Epple and Romano (1996b) (hereafter referred to as ER). It
follows from an analogous argument of ER that preferences over tax rates are single-peaked
and a majority voting equilibrium always exists. It is noted that there is a diﬀerence
between the ER model and our model. In the ER model, households with income below
(above) the mean income prefer a positive (zero) tax rate. In our model, households
whose number of children per unit of income is larger (smaller) than the mean number of
children per unit of income prefer a positive (zero) tax rate. The tax price of education to
households with a larger number of children per unit of income than the mean is below the
market price; thus, they beneﬁt from positive taxes. However, the incentive to redistribute
via public provision of education is limited and a household’s utility is maximized at a tax
rate strictly less than 1. Since the public service cannot be sold, the costs arise in the form
of ineﬃcient allocation between education and consumption.14 The above description is
14In this model, the labor supply is endogenously determined as a result of the fertility decision. However,
the limitation on the incentive to redistribute in our model diﬀers from that in Meltzer and Richard (1981),
16formally presented by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. (i) The most preferred tax rate for household i with ni/[wi(1 − zni)] < ¯ n/¯ m
is zero. The most preferred tax rate for household i with ni/[wi(1 − zni)] > ¯ n/¯ m is
γφ/(1 − γ + γφ). Household i with ni/[wi(1 − zni)] = ¯ n/¯ m is indiﬀerent among t in
[0,γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)] but prefers any t in that interval to the remainder. (ii) If household
i with ni/[wi(1 − zni)] < ¯ n/¯ m is median in terms of the number of children per unit of
income, t =0is chosen by voting. If household i with ni/[wi(1 − zni)] > ¯ n/¯ m is the
median, t = γφ/(1 − γ + γφ) is chosen. If household i with ni/[wi(1 − zni)] = ¯ n/¯ m is the
median, any t in [0,γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)] can be chosen.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 3 depicts the description of Lemma 1; the preferences over tax rates are single-
peaked and the median-voter theorem holds.15 The statement of Lemma 1 is consistent
with some empirical results: childless voters are less likely to support public-school spend-
ing than voters with children (e.g., Rubinfeld, 1977).16
Since the decisive voter is the household with the median number of children per unit
of income, we need to ﬁnd out which household is the median in terms of this criterion.
For this purpose, we can use the result of Section 2: for any given t, a household’s number
of children does not increase with wage, and the quantity of labor supply does not decrease
with wage—that is, labor income is strictly increasing with wage. Therefore, a household’s
number of children per unit of income is strictly decreasing with wage, and the household
with median wage also has the median number of children per unit of income. To obtain
predictions about the voting outcome, we have only to focus on the voting behavior of the
where the presence of labor supply incentives limits the incentive to redistribute. Since fertility decisions
are made prior to the voting stage, each household does not consider the eﬀect of public policy on labor
supply incentives at the time of making the political decision; the incentive here to redistribute is limited
solely by diminishing marginal utility.
15The result that households where the number of children per unit of income is larger than the mean
number of children per unit of income prefer the same tax rate comes from the assumption of logarithmic
utility. However, the existence of majority voting equilibrium does not depend on such speciﬁcation (see
Epple and Romano, 1996b).
16Lemma 1 describes the political outcome under the assumption that the dual-provision regime is
already established. Even if the regime itself can be determined by majority rule, the dual-provision
regime is not defeated by the market-only regime or government-only regime and Lemma 1 holds. It can
be proved by exactly the same way as the proof of Proposition 2 in Epple and Romano (1996b).
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Figure 3: The indirect utility functions of (a) household i with ni/[wi (1 − zni)] < ¯ n/¯ m,
(b) household i with ni/[wi (1 − zni)] = ¯ n/¯ m, and (c) household i with ni/[wi (1 − zni)] >
¯ n/¯ m
households with median wage. It follows from Lemma 1 that the optimal voting rule of
such households is given by
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
vote on t =0 i f
nM
wM(1−znM) < ¯ n
¯ m,







wM(1−znM) = ¯ n
¯ m,
vote on t =
γφ
1−γ+γφ if nM
wM(1−znM) > ¯ n
¯ m,
where wM is the median wage, which is deﬁned by F (wM)=1 /2, and nM is the number
of children of households with median wage.
3.3 Rational-expectation Political Equilibrium
Here, we deﬁne the following function:
Υ(t) ≡
nM





18which represents the diﬀerence between the median number of children per unit of income
and the mean number of children per unit of income as a function of t. It follows from ni






(1−γ+γφ)z(1−t)wM¯ n−t ¯ m − ¯ n
¯ m if t<ˆ t,
γ
(1−γ)zwM − ¯ n
¯ m if t ≥ ˆ t,
(13)








,t h a ti s ,ˆ t is the threshold tax rate for the
median households. If t is less (more) than ˆ t, the median households choose a positive
(zero) supplement. It should be noted that ¯ n and ¯ m are also functions of t (see (19) and
(20)). The function Υ(t) captures the marginal preferences of the median households over
tax rates in equilibrium. If Υ(t) > 0, the median households prefer higher tax rates as
long as t is lower than γφ/(1 − γ + γφ); if Υ(t) < 0, they prefer lower tax rates as long as
t is positive; and if Υ(t) = 0, then they prefer the present tax rate. Using this function,
we can formulate the equilibrium condition as follows.
Equilibrium condition. The equilibrium tax rate t∗ must satisfy
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
Υ(0)≤ 0i f t∗ =0 ,
















It follows from this equilibrium condition that we obtain the existence result.
Proposition 4. There exists at least one rational-expectation political equilibrium for any
wage distribution F (·).
Proof. It is easily veriﬁed that Υ(0) ≤ 0 if and only if the median wage is not below
the mean wage, wM ≥ ¯ w.I f wM ≥ ¯ w,t h e nΥ ( 0 )≤ 0a n dt = 0 is an equilibrium
tax rate. If wM < ¯ w,t h e nΥ ( 0 )> 0a n dt = 0 is not an equilibrium tax rate. In
this case, there are two possibilities at the other corner: Υ(γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)) ≥ 0o r
Υ(γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)) < 0. If Υ(γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)) ≥ 0, then t = γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)i sa n
equilibrium tax rate. If Υ(γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)) < 0, then t = γφ/(1 − γ + γφ) is not an
19equilibrium tax rate; however, as Υ(·) is continuous, there is at least one value of t at
which Υ(t) = 0. Thus the result is obtained.
Below are some of the results on the property of equilibrium.
Proposition 5. (i) Government provision is positive if the median wage is less than
the mean wage. (ii) There can exist multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria arise if and
only if there exists t  such that Υ(t )=0and Υ(t) is increasing at t . (iii) If multiple
equilibria exist, then the private supplement of median households is positive in at least one
equilibrium. (iv) Suppose that there exist multiple equilibria. Then, for any two equilibria,
a and b, we have ¯ n∗ (ta) < ¯ n∗  
tb 
↔ ta <t b.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The functional form of Υ(t) might be complex and it is diﬃcult to obtain further
analytical results without any speciﬁcation. Figure 4 presents a numerical example of
Υ(t). The example uses lognormal distribution F
 
μ,σ2 
as the wage distribution, where
μ and σ2 are the mean and variance of the underlying normal distribution, respectively. We
assume that z =0 .1, γ =0 .4, φ =0 .8, and σ =0 .55. These parameter values are chosen
on the basis of two criteria: (i) the parameter values themselves should be reasonable, and
(ii) the values of the endogenous variables that follow from those parameter values should
also be reasonable (see Appendix B for details). Figure 4 exhibits multiple equilibria;
there are three tax rates that satisfy the equilibrium condition (14).17 It is noted that
the middle-tax equilibrium is the knife-edge case, in which Υ(t)i si n c r e a s i n ga tΥ( t)=0 :
that is, there are two stable equilibria. We now explain the intuition of the condition for
multiplicity.
Multiple equilibria arise if and only if there is more than one tax rate supported by the
households with median wage. Given a tax rate t, there are two groups in the economy:
one prefers higher tax rates and the other, lower. Υ(t) > (<) 0 implies that the households
17The occurrence of multiplicity is not restricted to that parameter conﬁguration. Multiplicity broadly
occurs under various parameter sets that satisfy the two criteria mentioned above. This can be veriﬁed
numerically by varying parameters z, γ, φ,a n dσ. The numerial results are available from the authors
upon request.
20Figure 4: Political Equilibrium
with median wage belong to the group supporting higher (lower) tax rates at t.I fΥ ( t) >
(<)0f o ra n yt, then a majority of the population is better oﬀ as t rises (falls): diﬀerent tax
rates cannot be supported by the majority. The existence of t such that Υ(t) = 0 implies
that there exists a tax rate such that the political group to which median households
belong changes on reaching that rate; this is a necessary condition for diﬀerent tax rates
to be supported by the majority.
The slope of Υ(t) represents the relative responsiveness of the median households to
the change of tax rate in their fertility decisions as compared to the average households.18
A positive slope implies that the median households are more responsive than the average
households: if t rises, then the median number of children per unit of income increases
more than the average number of children per unit of income. When Υ(t)i si n c r e a s i n gi n
t, decisive households can free-ride on the inelastic fertility behavior of average households;
in the high-tax equilibrium, the decisive households beneﬁt from the high tax rate because
their fertility is high, their tax base is small, and thus, the tax price of education is low.
Therefore, the decisive households will vote for a high tax rate and sustain the equilibrium.
The opposite happens in the low-tax equilibrium.19
18It is noted that the “average households” do not mean the households with average wage but mean the
virtual households whose behavior is equivalent to the average behavior of all households. In this model,
generally, ¯ n  = n(¯ w).
19Saint-Paul and Verdier (1997) formulate a necessary condition for multiplicity in a politico-economic
model where heterogeneous agents ex post vote on policy as the “elasticity principle:” the behavior of
decisive agents, which determines their identity at the time of voting, is more responsive to the expected
policy than that of average agents. In our model, that condition corresponds to the positive slope of Υ(t).
21The multiplicity is characterized by the coexistence of a high-fertility, low-private/public-
education-ratio equilibrium and a low-fertility, high-private/public-education-ratio equi-
librium. This implies that countries that appear similar in their overall characteristics
(e.g., income per capita and wage inequality) sometimes end up with widely diﬀerent pub-
lic policies for children, private/public spending ratios and fertility rates, and the same
countries may jump from one equilibrium to another from time to time. The solution of
the numerical example above is presented in Appendix B. As predicted by the analytical
results, the fertility rate, ¯ n∗, the proportion of households with no supplement, F (ˆ w∗),
and the ratio of public spending, g∗¯ n∗/E∗, are higher in the high-tax equilibrium than in
the low-tax equilibrium. The majority supplements the public provision in the low-tax
equilibrium, whereas it does not do so in the high-tax equilibrium; each equilibrium is
sustained by the majority households’ behaviors.20
3.4 Alternative Timing Assumption
The timing of events is crucial for the property of political equilibrium. If we assume
that each household can adjust fertility after the funding level for public education has
been determined, the results are greatly altered: (i) preferences over tax rates are not
single-peaked and (ii) the multiplicity of equilibria disappears. For multiplicity to arise,
the fertility decision aﬀecting the identity of decisive voters must be made prior to the
political decision. If the political decision is made prior to the fertility decision, the decisive
households vote on the generically unique tax rate that maximizes their utility. Thus, the
disappearance of multiplicity is a rather natural result.
We now discuss the non-single-peakedness in detail. For deriving the indirect utility
over tax rates in the adjustable case, we have only to solve the maximization problem
given by (5) and (6), and substitute maximizers into the utility function. That is, the
diﬀerence from the nonadjustable case (Lemma 1) is that the number of children, ni,i s
not given but controllable in the voting process. Figure 5 illustrates the indirect utility
20In Japan and South Korea, more than half of the households send their children to private-tutoring
facilities (see for instance Bray (2006)). Based on our theory, the distinctive feature of these countries,
which is characterized by the prevalence of private tutoring and very low fertility, might be self-fulﬁllingly
sustained by the majority households.
22Figure 5: Preferences over tax rates in the adjustable case
over tax rates for households with diﬀerent wages under the same parameter set as the
numerical example above, where ˆ tl, ˆ tm, ˆ tu are the threshold tax rates for 30-percentile,
50-percentile, and 70-percentile households in wage distribution, respectively. Preferences
over tax rates are no longer single-peaked, but a majority voting equilibrium still exists
because our choice of utility function satisﬁes a single-crossing condition (Gans and Smart,
1996). In the case of the parameter set that we are considering, as is clear from Figure 5,
t =0i sc h o s e nb ym a j o r i t yv o t i n g .
In a politico-economic model regarding public provision of private goods, it is known
that, generally, preferences are not single-peaked if agents can opt out of but not supple-
ment public provision (Stiglitz, 1974; Epple and Romano, 1996a; Glomm and Ravikumar,
1998), whereas preferences are single-peaked if agents can supplement, but not opt out
(Epple and Romano, 1996b; Gouveia, 1997). The non-single-peakedness in our nonad-
justable case can be explained by an analogous argument of the opting-out model.21 In
the standard opting-out model, the fact that agents can freely opt out of the public regime
after policy determination simply leads to non-single-peakedness.22 In our endogenous fer-
21Preferences over tax rates in the opting-out model are typically similar to those of Figure 5 (see Glomm
and Ravikumar, 1998).
22Intuitively, in the standard opting-out model, non-single-peakedness occurs according to the following
mechanism. At low levels of public-service quality, a household that prefers high-quality service might
prefer private alternatives. A small increase in quality might be bad for the household because the tax
rate rises whereas the increase in service quality is not suﬃcient to induce the household to consume the
public service. A large increase in public service quality, however, might be good for the household. The
household might be induced to use the public alternative, and the increased tax cost may be oﬀset by the
savings from forgoing private services.
23tility model, households cannot opt out, but the fact that households can decide whether
or not to have children implies that, in eﬀect, they have a choice between opting out or
not.
As stated above, it seems reasonable to assume that the fertility decision is made
prior to the political decision. However, if a government can commit to a speciﬁed policy
over a certain amount of time, say, at least a decade or so, then the order of decisions is
reversed. The discussion of this subsection suggests that the availability of commitment
might greatly alter the implication of the policy targeted at children. The above comes
from the fact that the fertility decision is irreversible and that child-rearing takes time to
complete.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Our objective in this paper was to analyze the public provision of children’s goods in a
model where agents are allowed to supplement the publicly provided quantity by private
purchase and the fertility is endogenously determined. Using a simple functional form
for preferences and standard assumptions about the quantity-quality tradeoﬀ for children,
we developed an extension of the model of Epple and Romano (1996b) and Gouveia
(1997). Some key results are as follows. If we choose the realistically plausible assumption
regarding the timing of events, then the single-peakedness of the preferences over tax rates
is satisﬁed in the voting process and a rational-expectation political equilibrium always
exists. The sequential interaction between fertility and political decisions might lead to
multiple equilibria: a high-fertility, low-private/public-spending-ratio equilibrium and a
low-fertility, high-private/public-spending-ratio equilibrium. Whether a government can
commit to a speciﬁed policy over a certain amount of time crucially aﬀects the implication
of the public policy targeted at children.
This paper oﬀers a theory explaining the large diﬀerences in the fertility and structure
of child-related spending across countries. The public spending per child is high in Nordic
countries and much lower in Southern European and East Asian countries. Based on our
model, these countries can be thought of as in diﬀerent equilibria. Such diﬀerences can of
24course be explained not only by multiplicity but also by diﬀerences in underlying economic
conditions. However, the explanation obtained using multiplicity has obvious appeal: the
characteristics of an economy can suddenly change owing to the shift from one equilibrium
to another even if it is only the policy expectation that changes. While fertility rates have
declined over the past decades in almost all OECD countries, the pace of decline and
the level achieved diﬀer across countries. The fertility decline was more drastic in some
countries than others; one striking example is South Korea. Up to the early 1970s, the
total fertility rate of South Korea had been over 4. In less than twenty years, that rate
reduced to about 1.5. This drastic decline of fertility has coincided with sharp rises in
both the education/consumption ratio in households and the ratio of private spending on
education to public spending; the ratio of elementary pupils who participate in private
tutoring was 12.9% in 1980, whereas that in 2003 was 83.1% (Kwak, 2004). Even if we
take the rapid economic development of South Korea into consideration, it appears to be
diﬃcult to explain the drastic change in such a short period of time only in terms of the
change in underlying economic conditions such as income level and wage distribution.
In the politico-economic literature, the political conﬂict over public education has often
been discussed in terms of the intergenerational conﬂict (e.g. Levy, 2005): given the size
of government, the young with school-age children support public education, whereas the
old prefer direct income redistribution. Our model concentrates on the intragenerational
conﬂict between the group with many children and the group with fewer children, where
the number of children is endogenously determined by each household. This paper is
more likely to complement rather than contradict the studies on the intergenerational
conﬂict. According to previous studies, the smaller the size of the population of the young
relative to that of the old, the less public education is likely to be politically supported. If
the young do not support public education, the funds for education would shrink further.
Furthermore, the low fertility rate of the young generation leads to the aging of population
structures; therefore, the public education is less likely to be politically supported in the
future. The shift from a high-fertility equilibrium to a low-fertility equilibrium, implied
by our model, might trigger further declines in the public spending on education and the
25fertility rate.
Appendix A
For convenience, we rewrite equations (11) and (12) respectively as
Ω(¯ m, ¯ n;t)=0 , (15)






γ (1 − φ)(1− t)w¯ n
z (1 − t)w¯ n − t¯ m
dF (w),
and
Ψ(¯ m, ¯ n;t)=0 , (16)
where Ψ(¯ m, ¯ n;t) ≡ ¯ m − (1 − γ)







(1 − γ + γφ)z (1 − t)w¯ n − t¯ m
z (1 − t)w¯ n − t¯ m
dF (w).
Proof of Proposition 2
















[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2 dF (w)
> 0. (17)















[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2 dF (w)
> 0. (18)
Both the fertility curve and the labor-income curve are upward sloping in the (¯ m, ¯ n)
space. Evaluating (11) at ¯ m =0a n da t ¯ m = ∞,w eo b t a i n¯ n| ¯ m=0 = γ (1 − φ)/z and
¯ n| ¯ m=∞ = γ/z, respectively. It follows that the fertility curve intersects the ¯ n-axis at
γ (1 − φ)/z, and it approaches γ/z as ¯ m →∞ . Evaluating (12) at ¯ n =0a n da t¯ n = ∞,
we obtain ¯ m|¯ n=0 =( 1− γ)¯ w and ¯ m|¯ n=∞ =( 1− γ + γφ)¯ w, respectively, where ¯ w is the
26mean of wage distribution
  ∞
0 wdF (w). It follows that the labor-income curve intersects
the ¯ m-axis at (1 − γ)¯ w, and it approaches (1 − γ + γφ)¯ w as ¯ n →∞ . As the two curves
are continuous, they must intersect at least once.
Uniqueness. Using (15) and (16), we obtain the following relationship:






















[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2 dF (w)
   ∞
ˆ w
γ(1−φ)z(1−t)tw2 ¯ m
[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2 dF (w)
< 0.
The slope of the labor-income curve is larger than that of the fertility curve for any ¯ m in
the (¯ m, ¯ n) space. Therefore, the intersection point of the two curves is unique (if any).
Further, the labor-income curve crosses the fertility curve from beneath.
Proof of Proposition 3















[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2 dF (w)
≥ 0.
















[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2 dF (w)
≤ 0.
Equality holds if ¯ n = 0 and inequality holds if ¯ n  =0 .Ar i s ei nt rotates the fertility curve
upward around a point at ¯ m = 0 and the labor-income curve to the left around a point
at ¯ n =0i nt h e(¯ m, ¯ n) space. In the diagram, the total eﬀect on the equilibrium fertility
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[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2dF (w)
1+γ (1 − φ)(1− t)t
  ∞
ˆ w
zw2¯ n+w ¯ m
[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2dF (w)
> 0. (19)
(ii) The total eﬀect on the equilibrium average labor income is also ambiguous in the





Ω¯ nΨt − ΩtΨ¯ n







1+γ (1 − φ)(1− t)t
  ∞
ˆ w
zw2¯ n+w ¯ m
[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]
2dF (w)
< 0. (20)
(iii) Diﬀerentiating (7) with respect to t by noting that the relationship between ¯ n∗
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1+γ (1 − φ)(1− t)t
  ∞
ˆ w
zw2¯ n+w ¯ m
[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2dF (w)
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¯ n + γφ(1 − t)
  ∞
ˆ w wdF (w)
,
where E denotes the total spending on education, and the numerator and denominator of
this equation represent the public spending on education and total spending on education,










[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]2dF (w)
E2
 
1+γ (1 − φ)(1− t)t
  ∞
ˆ w
zw2¯ n+w ¯ m
[z(1−t)w¯ n−t ¯ m]
2dF (w)
  > 0.
28Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that the average fertility rate is ¯ n and the average labor income is ¯ m. The decision









+ γ lnni +( 1− γ)ln[wi (1 − zni)(1− t) − sini].





γφwi(1−zni)(1−t)¯ n−(1−γ)t ¯ mni
(1−γ+γφ)ni¯ n if t<˜ t(wi,n i),
si =0 i f t ≥ ˜ t(wi,n i),
where ˜ t(wi,n i) ≡
γφwi (1 − zni)¯ n
(1 − γ)¯ mni + γφwi (1 − zni)¯ n
.
The indirect utility in the case of t ≤ ˜ t(wi,n i)i s
A +( 1− γ + γφ)ln
 






where A is a constant term. This is strictly decreasing (increasing) in t for household i




+ γ lnni +( 1− γ)lnwi (1 − zni)(1− t).
This is strictly concave, and maximized at t = γφ/(1 − γ + γφ)i f˜ t(wi,n i) <γ φ / (1 −
γ + γφ) and maximized at t = ˜ t(wi,n i)i f˜ t(wi,n i) >γ φ / (1 − γ + γφ). It is veriﬁed
that for household i with ni/wi (1 − zni) < (>)¯ n/¯ m, ˜ t(wi,n i) is larger (smaller) than
γφ/(1 − γ + γφ). To sum up, for household i with ni/[wi (1 − zni)] < ¯ n/¯ m, the indirect
utility is strictly decreasing in t and maximized at t = 0, whereas for household i with
ni/wi (1 − zni) > ¯ n/¯ m, the indirect utility is strictly concave and maximized at t =
γφ/(1 − γ + γφ) (see Figure 4). It follows that preferences over tax rates are clearly single-
peaked and standard theorems guaranteeing the existence of a majority voting equilibrium
hold. Thus, the result is obtained.
29Proof of Proposition 5
(i) This follows immediately from the result that Υ(0) > 0 if and only if the median wage is
less than the mean wage. (ii) This follows immediately from the continuity of Υ(·)a n dt h e
equilibrium condition (14). (iii) It is easily veriﬁed from (13) and Proposition 3 that Υ(t)
is decreasing in t for a suﬃciently high t such that t>ˆ t, when the median households
choose zero supplement. Therefore, if there exists t  such that Υ(t )=0a n dΥ ( t)i s
increasing at t ,t h e nt  < ˆ t, when the median households choose positive supplement.
Thus, the result is obtained. (iv) This follows immediately from Proposition 3.
Appendix B
Choice of the Parameters in the Numerical Example
The choice of z. Parameter z represents the time cost for having a child. We follow
the procedure of de la Croix and Doepke (2004) for the determination of this parameter.
Evidence in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Knowles (1999) suggests that the opportunity
cost of a child is equivalent to about 20% of the parents’ time endowment. This cost only
accrues as long as the child is living with the parents. If we assume that children live with
parents for 15 years and that the adult period lasts 30 years, the overall time cost should
be 50% of the time cost per year with the child present. Accordingly, we choose z =0 .1.
The choice of γ. Parameter γ, which is the weight of children in the utility function,
directly inﬂuences the number of children in each household. In particular, for households
with no private education, given a value of z, their fertility is determined exclusively by
the value of γ. We set it such that the upper bound on the number of children (that is,
the number of children in households with no private education) is four, because there
is generally no income class where the average fertility rate reaches ﬁve. This leads to
γ =0 .4b e c a u s ew ec h o o s ez =0 .1.
The choice of φ. Parameter φ represents the relative weight given to the quality of
30Low-tax equilibrium High-tax equilibrium
t∗ 0.031 0.348
¯ n∗ 1.262 3.582
F (ˆ w∗) 0.021 0.763
g∗¯ n∗/E∗ 0.089 0.812
Table 1: Results of the Numerical Example







It follows that parameter φ determines the upper bound on the fertility diﬀerential. We
choose φ =0 .8 so that the fertility ratio between households with the lowest and highest
wage is 5.




,w h e r eμ and σ2 are the mean and variance of the underlying normal distribution,






− 1, where N is
the standard normal distribution function. We choose σ =0 .55, corresponding to a Gini
coeﬃcient of 0.3027.
Results of the Numerical Example
See Table 1.
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